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A Victim of
"Permissive Counterclaims"
(Under the New Colorado Code)
By FRANK SWANCARA*
John Decent was an old man, but still industrious. During past
years he had many business losses, including worthless debts. He was
often a personal surety or accommodation maker on notes of persons
who never paid. He became liable on many obligations. His moral
sense compelled him to acknowledge an indebtedness, whenever it was
suggested, so that statutes of limitation meant nothing to him. He
would not defeat creditors by invoking bankruptcy laws. He was not
sued, because poor. Then came April 6, 1941, a dark day for this
honest but impecunious John, for the Supreme Court liberated a swarm
of legal hornets known as "permissive counterclaims."
Many of these
came to sting, and mortally, this good-intentioned citizen.
On May 6, 1941, John Decent was totally and permanently disabled as a result of the negligence of Jeff Rekless. After four months
of confinement and pain this injured party filed a complaint, using
"Form 9" against the tortfeasor. Many weeks prior to this, Jeff employed a lawyer reputed, in cigar stores, to be "astute," and who did
not fail to consider the plaintiff-killing potentialities of Rule 13 (b) :
"A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an
opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
He also noticed that Rule 13 (c) permits counterclaims "exceeding in
amount" the plaintiff's claims, and that under Rule 18 (a) a defendant
may join "as many claims * * * as he may have."
There is nothing in any of dur Rules corresponding to a provision
of the New Jersey Practice Act of 1912 which authorized a court to
strike out any counterclaim that "cannot be conveniently disposed of in
the pending action,"' nor have we any rule corresponding to that section
of the New York Civil Practice Act which provides that the court "may
in its discretion, whenever the interests of justice require, * * * strike out
a counterclaim without prejudice to the bringing of another action. "2
Even under that provision, the courts claim no discretion to deny pleading and trial of counterclaims which a defendant obtained by assignment.
Our Rule 13 (b) is, in effect, the same as Section 266 of the Civil Practice
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Kelley
v. Faitoute, etc. Co.. 87 N. J. L. 567, 94 Atl. 802.
2
Smyth v. McDonogh, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 631.
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Act of New York, as amended in 1936, and it was said in a recent case
that a counterclaim "though obviously acquired by the defendant for
the purpose of set-off, * * * was properly interposed. " 3 In an earlier
case it was said that a defendant may "procure the sale of assignment to
himself of causes of action against a plaintiff for the purpose of interposing them as counterclaims. "
Counsel for Jeff Rekless knew the situation of John Decent, plaintiff, and that claims against him could be purchased at 10 cents on the
dollar. Encouraged by the New York decisions, he advised defendant
to buy up as many claims as possible. Knowing that an action was impending, Jeff acquired some of the claims before complaint was filed, and
some afterwards and prior to the time for service of defendant's pleading.
Defendant then had all he could obtain by assignment from stores, physicians, and payees of notes on which plaintiff was indorser or accommodation maker. Rule 13 (e) did not concern him.
Rule 13 (e) provides:
"A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader
after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be
presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading."
Since a defendant guilty of a harmful tort has reason to believe that he
will be sued, if not already sued, he can acquire counterclaims at any time
between the date of the tort and the date of his own pleading. Since an
assignee is a real party in interest, if the assignment was not merely colorable, a claim, even if unliquidated,' obtained by assignment can be
used as a counterclaim, and Rule 13 (b) permits this even if plaintiff sues
in tort.
Not only may counterclaims result in a final judgment for defendant, as for an excess over plaintiff's claims, but if a plaintiff sues for his
own wages, by the use of assigned claims a defendant can deprive the
plaintiff of the benefits of the statute intended to save to him 60% of
his wages. That 60% is protected from execution, garnishment, etc.,
but not from counterclaims.6
Coming back to the hypothetical case of Decent v. Rekless, the
plaintiff could have, before bringing any action for damages for personal
injuries, become a voluntary bankrupt and obtained a discharge as to all
obligations acquired or which could be acquired by defendant, or held
by others. He would not have been compelled to surrender to the trustee
in bankruptcy his cause of action for tort, because the same is not such a
8

Scientific, etc. Corp. v. Bd., 16 N. Y. S. 2d 91. 93.
'Bricken Corp. v. Cushman, 297 N. Y. S. 194, 195.
'Michigan Co. v. Pueblo Co., 51 Colo. 160, 164.
'Rutter v. Shurnway, 16 Colo. 95.
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Ichose in action" as is subject to garnishment.7

The bankruptcy act
provides: "That rights of action ex delicto for * * * injuries to the
person of the bankrupt * * * shall not vest in the trustee unless by the
law of the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, execution,
garnishment, * * * or other judicial process. "s

But John Decent contin-

ued to shun the bankruptcy court.
After all or many interrogatories, propounded under Rule 33, were
answered, it was predictable that Decent would be able to prove himself
entitled to $10,000 as compensation for his injuries and disability, but
at the same time it seemed that Rekless, if careful, would be able to have
it adjudged that plaintiff owes him $15,000 on the counterclaims.
These cost $1,500, if purchased at 10 cents on the dollar, and so defendant would profit to the extent of $13,500, if execution could be satisfied
on a judgment for $5,000 in his favor, that being the excess of the
counterclaims over plaintiff's claim. If John had no property, defendant could still obtain $10,000 from his liability insurer. This assumes
that the insurance contract provided that the insurer would pay judgments against the insured, and here, so far as the insurer was concerned,
there would be a judgment against Rekless, the insured, in the sum of
$10,000, notwithstanding that as between the parties litigant themselves there would be but one final judgment, 9 and that for defendant,
according to the usual practice.1° So it seems that a potential bandit
may ignore banks and discard his gun. He can take out liability insurance, then strike down, with an automobile, the chosen victim. He can
then advertise for and buy up claims against the prospective plaintiff,
and be ready with "permissive counterclaims."
Though the litigation
might leave the injured party a pauper, he himself might depart from
court with a swag.
John Decent, plaintiff, was much depressed by the thought that
ultimately he would get nothing. If all the issues were tried, he would
be compelled to suffer a judgment against himself for $5,000, because
the counterclaims exceeded, by that sum, the amount recoverable by him.
He ended it all, for himself, with monoxide gas. But since we have
liberal rules on Substitution of Parties, the counterclaims remained to
vex and burden his children, and to their full extent, for his own claim
for $10,000 or more, being in tort, died with him.
Suppose that this was an actual case and all issues came to trial.
Plaintiff's lawyer was employed as if in and for one case, but the counterclaims compelled him to work as if in defending a dozen, each involv7

Coty v. Cogswell (Mont.), 50 Pac. (2d) 249.
"Sec. 110 (a) -5. title 11, U. S. C.: 52 Stat. 880.
'Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 Fed. (2d) 406.
1057 C. J. 521.
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ing different legal questions and the necessity of proving or disproving a
different set of facts. The more work that the counterclaims imposed on
plaintiff's lawyer the lesser became the probability of compensation, if
he had to depend on a contingent fee based on amount of recovery. If
the final judgment would have been in favor of defendant for a balance
of'$5,000, there would be no recovery upon which an attorney's lien
could attach or from which plaintiff could pay his counsel for work in
establishing and getting a verdict for plaintiff's own claim for $10,000.
Not only may a tort-plaintiff's counsel be compelled to work for
nothing, but he may also be compelled to incur the displeasure of his own
client. Suppose here the lawyer advised John that some of the counterclaims are outlawed, and that he need never pay them. If defendant
serves an interrogatory under Rule 33, plaintiff's answer might be construed and held by a court as an "acknowledgment * * * in form of
writing,"" so as to toll the statute of limitations.12 Still another interrogatory may compel, in this assumed case, the plaintiff to answer: "I
do not remember how much I owed to defendant's assignor." Thereupon defendant and his assignor can fabricate evidence as to the amount
of the assigned indebtedness. Perjury is safe, and therefore encouraged,
where its victim is unable to expose it.
While Rule 13 (b) was designed "to enable the disposition of a
whole controversy,'' 13 and to settle all disputes between a plaintiff and
defendant, the settled law as to availability of assigned claims as counterclaims" enables a defendant to compel plaintiff to suffer trial and
adjudication as to obligations incurred to strangers. Where these are
upon promissory notes, the defendant, as purchaser, can claim to be a
holder in due course, and thus rob plaintiff of his defenses. If one is
severely injured in an automobile accident, and sues on account thereof,
the circumstances may make him unable to defend, effectively, one or
more unexpected counterclaims obtained by defendant by assignment,
and if defendant's recovery exceeds that of plaintiff, the latter is but
punished, and not compensated, for his personal injuries. Possibly at
the time the Federal Rules were being formulated, inquiring minds did
not inquire enough, but stopped with the question: Can a defendant
in a tort case "come back with a promissory note and adjust that in the
same suit?"' 1 A defendant can "come back" in many other ways, and
make of Rule 13 (b) a Jack the plaintiff-killer.
'Sec. 26, Ch. 102, C. S. A.
'Note 10in 37 C. J. 1116.
'Kuenzel v. Universal etc. Co., 29 F. Supp. 407.
157 C. J. 505.
"Proceedings of A. B. A. Institute on Federal Rules, as quoted in Kuenzel v.
Universal etc. Co., supra, note 13.

What Happens to the
Tax Return After
It Is Filed?
Procedure Before the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Board of Tax Appeals
By R. P. HERTZOG"
(Continued from March Issue)
All cases not disposed of by settlement and not carried on the
board's reserve calendar are set for hearing at the place designated therefor.
In the larger cities frequent hearings are held, while in the smaller cities
hearings are usually held for a period of one or two weeks about every
year--sometimes twice a year, depending upon the number of cases on
the circuit calendar at each particular place. Comparatively few hearings
are now held in Washington. The hearings are conducted by one member of the board except in unusual cases where two or three members may
sit to hear a particular case. With the exception of those rare instances
only one member of the board conducts hearings.
The proceedings of the board are conducted in accordance with such
rules of practice and procedure as the board may itself prescribe and in
accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the Federal courts.
The case is heard de novo by the board and the files of the bureau, including the return and any documents which may have been submitted to the
bureau during its consideration of the case do not become a part of the
record unless actually introduced and admitted in evidence at the hearing.
The proceeding is initiated by the taxpayer, who is the moving party in
the proceeding. The deficiency notice is considered prima facie correct
and the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer except in cases involving
the fraud penalty or cases involving transferee liability: that is, where a
petitioner is considered liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer
without assets or in the case of affirmative issues (including claims for
increased deficiencies) raised in the answer, where such burden is by
statute placed upon the commissioner.
It is incumbent upon the taxpayer, except in the cases mentioned,
to show that the commissioner's determination is invalid, regardless of
*Address delivered before Mid-Winter Legal Institute. Denver Bar Association.
Denver, Colorado, January 24, 194 1.
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the correctness of his theory or the reasons which he may have assigned
for the increase in tax liability proposed. Due to the well-established
presumption of correctness attaching to the commissioner's action, many
cases have been dismissed for failure on the part of the taxpayer to overcome that presumption or to prosecute his appeal after filing a petition.
The board has also stricken the fraud penalty and has refused to sustain
transferee liability or increased deficiencies because of the failure of the
commissioner to sustain his burden in many cases.
At the time of the hearing before the board, the attorney representing the taxpayer should be prepared in an opening statement to explain
the issues which have been raised and which he desires the board to pass
upon, as well as give a brief summary of the facts to be introduced by
testimony in support of the position taken. In cases where witnesses
are located at distant points or are unable to be present at the hearing
to give their testimony in person, provisions are made in the board's rules
for the taking of depositions, if application is made therefor more than
thirty days prior to the date of the hearing, or by agreement with Government counsel. As a matter of general practice, cases are not argued
orally before the board at the conclusion of the hearing and a decision is
not usually rendered at that time. In practically all cases the arguments
of the parties are presented in written briefs which are filed within stated
periods after the close of the trial.
After a case has been submitted to the board, it is required to make
a written report which contains.findings of fact and an opinion. The
written opinion of the board member who heard the case becomes the
opinion of the board within thirty days unless during that period the
chairman of the board directs that the report shall be reviewed by the
entire board. The chairman also has authority to direct the publication
of opinions, but all opinions whether or not published are public records
open to inspection. The handing down of an opinion by the board
does not constitute its final decision. The law provides that the board's
decision shall be held to be rendered on the date that an order specifying
the amount of the deficiency or overpayment is entered in the board's
records. The result of the board's opinion is reflected in its final order
of redetermination, which, if the commissioner's determination is modified, is based upon recomputations filed under Rule 50 of the board's
rules of practice.
The board has its own rules regarding admission to its bar. The
mere fact that an attorney is a member of the bar in his local community
or is enrolled to practice before the Treasury Department does not of
itself entitle him to appear before the Board of Tax Appeals. Although
the commissioner is always represented by a member of the chief coun-
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sel's office, who, as before stated, is under the immediate supervision and
direction of the division counsel, the taxpayer may either appear pro se
or be represented by an attorney or a certified public accountant who has
satisfied the requirements under the board's rules. In the early days of
the board's history, a large number of taxpayers were represented by certified public accountants, but since then the number has diminished considerably. The trial of a case before the board is now quite generally
recognized as being the task of the lawyer or at least one trained in the
law who is familiar with court procedure and the rules of evidence.
When the board renders its decision, either party may within thirty
days thereafter request a rehearing or reconsideration or a review of the
decision by the entire board if the decision was not previously considered
by the full board. Decisions of the board are reviewable as a matter of
right by the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Either party may petition for
review within three months after the decision is rendered. Such review
is obtained by the filing of a petition for review with the clerk of the
board, who transmits such petition to the clerk of the court to which the
review is taken. Generally the board decisions may be reviewed only by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit wherein is located the collector's office in which the return was filed, or if no return was filed, then
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The taxpayer
and the commissioner, however, may, by written stipulation, agree to
have the board's decision reviewed by any other circuit court of appeals
or by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Each of the
reviewing courts has power to adopt rules for the filing of petitions for
review, the preparation of the record for review, and the conduct of proceedings upon such review.
It is well established that the findings of the board will not be disturbed by the reviewing court unless as a matter of law there is insufficient evidence on which such findings may be based. Generally, then,
the reviewing court concerns itself with a review of the board's decision
as to the law of the case. Upon review, the court has power to modify
or reverse the board's decision with or without remanding the case for a
rehearing. Decisions of the reviewing court are in turn reviewable by the
Supreme Court on petition for certiorari.
In view of the necessarily infrequent appearance of the Board of
Tax Appeals for hearings in the smaller cities (which includes Denver)
there is a certain provision of the board's rules of practice and procedure
I would like to call to your particular attention. In a large number of
the cases before the board, there is no real dispute between the parties as
to the primary facts involved, the only dispute being either the conclu-
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sions to be drawn therefrom or a strictly legal question involving interpretation of the revenue statute. After such cases are set for hearing,
they are usually submitted to the board on a stipulation of facts and no
oral evidence is submitted. All the hearing before the board consists of
is a statement of the issues by the taxpayer and the respondent and the
later submission of written briefs. In such cases, a hearing is not necessary and the board's rules provide for submission without such hearing.
I refer to Rule 30, which provides as follows:
"Any proceeding not requiring a hearing for the submission
of evidence * * * may be submitted at any time by notice of the
parties filed with the Board. The parties need not wait for the
proceeding to be calendered and need not appear in person. The
Chairman will then assign the proceeding to a Division for report,
which Division, upon request of the parties, will fix a time for filing
briefs or for oral argument."
When cases are submitted in this manner, the delay otherwise encountered in waiting for the board to set the case for hearing is avoided.
The stipulation can also be worked out without the rush and confusion
which sometimes exists after a case is actually set for hearing. We are
always glad to cooperate in attempting to reach an agreed statement of
facts for submission of cases in this manner, as well as at a hearing before
the board. I believe this procedure in appropriate cases warrants your
consideration.

Lectures in Legal Psychiatry
The fourteenth annual series of psychiatric clinics for lawyers and
senior law students by Dr. Franklin G. Ebaugh and his associates, of the
Colorado Psychopathic Hospital, will be offered on Wednesdays at 7:45
p. m. on March 26, April 2, 9, 16, 23 and 30. These six clinics are
offered gratuitously by Dr. Ebaugh and are held at Colorado Psychopathic Hospital, at Eighth Avenue near Ash Street.
These clinics, established in 1927-1928, originally for the senior
class of the University of Denver School of Law, were attended last
year also by the senior class of the University, of Colorado School of
Law. Dr. Ebaugh also kindly extends a special invitation this year to
members of the bar who may be interested.
In the course of the six clinics the principal types of mental ailments
are explained and illustrated. The clinics will begin at 7:45 p, m.,
sharp, each Wednesday.

The Possibility of

Reverfer in Colorado
By CHARLES MELVIN NEFF*
INTRODUCTION
1. In Colorado an owner of real estate has the legal right to
transfer it to another either absolutely or conditionally.
2.

Possibility of reverter defined.

3.

Importance of the doctrine.

4.

The language used to create the estate.

5.
The right of possibility of reverter contrasted with right of
re-entry.
6.

Rule against perpetuities.

7. The grantee of such an estate is accorded all the attributes of
an owner in fee simple as long as the condition is not broken.
8. Rights remaining in grantor after grant upon a conditional
limitation. This is the case of a true right of possibility of reverter.
9.
10.

Alienation inter vivos.
Release will accomplish an alienation to the grantee.

11.
The estate remaining in the grantor after a grant of realty
upon a condition subsequent and its alienability.
12. The quantity cf the estate or interest remaining in the grantor
and that estate or interest transferred to the grantee, by the creation of
the possibility of reverter, is determined by the method by which the
transfer is made.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Grant of rights of way by Congress.
Rights of way obtained by condemnation.
Rights of way obtained by voluntary sale and purchase.
Warranty deeds under Acts of Congress.

13.

Procedure indicated upon breach of the condition.

*Of the Denver Bar.
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I. In Coloradoan owner of real estate has the legal right to transfer it to another either absolutely or conditionally. Thus it was stated
by the Colorado Supreme Court, in its opinion delivered in Fusha, et al.
v.Dacona Town Site Company (Dec., 1915), 60 Colo. 315, 153 Pac.
226, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 108:
"It is an elementary principle of law that every owner of real
estate, in fee simple, has the legal right to dispose of it either absolutely
or conditionally, or to regulate the manner in which the same shall be
used and occupied as he may deem best and proper, provided, however,
that the conditions and restrictions imposed are not violative of the public good or subversive of the public interests. Therefore, if conditions
in a deed are made in good faith for a valuable consideration and nothing
malum in se or malum prohibiturn is stipulated for, they do not contravene public policy and should be enforced."
2. Possibility of reverter defined: Possibility of reverter must be
distinguished from "reverter" and from "reversion.." Challis on Real
Property (1911), 3rd edition by Sweet, page 82, says: "Reverter and
reversion are synonymous terms denoting an estate vested in interest
though not in possession; but the word reverter is sometimes loosely
used to denote what is properly styled possibility of reverter." He also
says: "Possibility of reverter denotes no estate, but, as the name implies,
only a possibility to have an estate at a future time." See page 83 of
Challis. Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 4, Permanent Edition, section 2182, correctly says: "The possibility of reverter, after the termination of a fee conditional, being a mere possibility, is not an estate (citing
Citing
many cases), and may be defeated by statutory enactment."
Union Colony Co. v. Gallie (1939), 104 Colo. 46, 88 Pac. (2d) 120.
"An estate in fee simple determinable sometimes referred to as a base
or qualified fee, is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land, creates an estate in fee simple, and provides that
the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated
event." Tiffany Real Property, 3rd edition, volume 1, section 220, also
saying: "This is the clear and satisfactory statement given in Restatement, Property, Section 44," and citing, among other cases, Burlington
& C. R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88
Pac. 154.
A possibility of reverter is defined in the Restatement of Property
as any reversionary interest which is subject to a condition precedent.
See Restatement, Property, section 154 (3). This is a much narrower
definition than that indicated by the decisions of the courts. For instance, the phrase possibility of reverter may refer to a situation creating
a conditional limitation, as in Board of Commissioners of El Paso
County, et al. v. City of Colorado Springs (1919), 66 Colo. 111, 180
Pac. 301, or to a situation creating a condition subsequent and hence
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creating a contingent right of re-entry, Union Colony v. Gallie (1939),
104 Colo. 46, 88 Pac. (2d) 120, again to cases where a conditional fee
was created, Lytle v. Hulen (1929), 128 Ore. 483, 275 Pac. 45, 114
A. L. R. Ann. 587, and to those cases wherein a so-called "easement"
only was granted. Lithgow v. Pearson (1913), 25 Colo. App. 70, 135
Pac. 759: Burlington & C. R. R. Co. v. Colo. & Eastern R. Co. (1906),
38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154. The able author of the note in 109 A. L. R.
Ann. 1148 calls attention to this confusion and makes the following
comment:
"An estate on a limitation or on a conditional limitation, sometimes called a 'condition in law,' a 'collateral limitation,' or a 'determinable fee,' is one which is to continue during the existence of a certain
state of circumstances, and subject to be terminated by a cessation of, or
a change in, such state of circumstances. A condition subsequent operates on an estate already created and vested, rendering it liable to be
defeated if the condition is broken. The distinction between an estate
on a conditional limitation and one subject to a condition subsequent is
that in the former the words creating it limit the continuation of the
estate to the time preceding and happening of the contingency, while in
the latter the words creating the condition do not originally limit thE
term, but merely permit its termination upon the happening of the contingency. The interest remaining in the grantor upon a conveyance of
the fee, either on a conditional limitation, or subject to a condition subsequent is usually treated as a possibility of reverter, although in the
latter case it is merely a possible right of re-entry. The possibility of
reverter in the former case is similar to, but not quite identical with, the
possibility of reverter in the latter case. It is the possibility that the land
may revert to the grantor when the granted estate determines, and represents whatever is not conveyed by the deed. All the estate is, in either
case, in the grantee until the happening of the contingency." Annotation in 109 A. L. R. at page 1149.
If on the facts the court holds the grantor has a mere right possibility of reverter, in contradistinEtion to a right of re-entry, following a
condition subsequent, then it will declare that when the condition is
broken, ips o facto and without any action on the grantor's part, the
grantor is at once automatically reinvested with the title. Cowell v.
Colorado Springs (1876), 3 Colorado 82, 100 U. S. 50 (selling of
intoxicating liquors-on the place) ; Burlington & C. R. Co. v. Colorado
Eastern R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154 (grant on the limitation that on the final abandonment of a right of way for a ditch the
right granted to maintain such ditch should cease and revert to the grantors construed as a limitation and not as a condition subsequent) ; Board
of Commissioners of El Paso County, et al. u. City of Colorado Springs

(1919),

66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (provisions in the deed that no
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intoxicating liquor be sold on the premises, that if the lot or any part of
it be used otherwise than for the purposes of building and maintaining a
courthouse thereon that the part not used for courthouse be kept and
maintained as a public park). On the other hand, where title to land is
conveyed upon a condition the court will hold the failure subsequent to
perform the condition does not divest the title. "The title is divested
only upon the entry of the grantor or his heirs for the condition broken,
or by a suit for the recovery of possession, or other act equivalent to an
entry. The possibility of reverter merely is not an estate in land, and
until the contingency of the condition happens the whole title is in the
grantee, and the grantor has nothing he can convey." Thompson, Real
Property, Permanent Edition, Vol. 4, section 2129, citing among many
authorities the cases of Denver & S. F. R. Co. t. School District (1890),
14 Colo. 327, 23 Pac. 978; Union Colony v. Gallie (1939), 104 Colo.
46, 88 Pac. (2d) .120.
This difference between the right of possibility of reverter and this
contingent right of re-entry upon breach of a condition subsequent is a
very important matter to remember in passing upon Colorado titles. If
the title examiner finds there has been a breach of the condition in the
first situation he then must find title to be in the grantor, but he cannot
find title in the grantor in the second situation unless and until the
grantor has made a re-entry or its equivalent.
"The difference is quite material," said the court in Owen v. Field
(1869), 102 Mass. 90, cited as authority and with approval in B. &
Colo. R. R. Co. v. Colo. Eastern R. R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88
Pac. 1.54. This is brought out clearly in Owen v. Field (1869), 102
Mass. 90, wherein an owner of land by an indenture granted to K and
his heirs "the whole use" of certain springs on the owner's land with the
right to lay pipes to conduct the water to a distant town. It also provided that if K should cease for a whole year to deliver water in the main
pipe that then the indenture was to cease and be of no effect. The court
held that the indenture conveyed to K no ownership of the soil in the
land but only "an easement," terminable at the pleasure of the grantees
by a non-user for the term of one year. The last clause of the indenture
should be c6nstrued, not as a condition subsequent, but as a limitation.
The difference is quite material. 'A limitation doth always determine the
estate without entry or zlaim, and so doth not a condition.' Also, 'a
stranger may take advantage of an estate determined by limitation, and
so he cannot upon condition.' Shep. Touch. 121. 'The apt and proper
words to make a limitation of an estate are quamdiu, dum' etc.; and in
this case the word 'if,' although used in the grant, is not sufficient of
itself to render it a grant defeasible on condition subsequent. The substance of the clause is not the forfeiture of a right, but the termination of
an onerous and unprofitable obligation." See page 105.
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3. Importance of the doctrine: The doctrine of the possibility of
reverter may seem at first sight to be a relatively unimportant doctrine
in the law of real property. The fact is, however, that in the examination of titles it often becomes a doctrine of considerable importance. This
will be especially true if the land conveyed should afterwards be found
to contain oil, gas, coal, lead, gold, or other fluid or fixed minerals in
valuable commercial quantities, or the land may, through change of circumstances, acquire additional and considerable commercial value. On
the oil and gas phase see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Thompson (1939),
106 Fed. (2d) 217. It is evident that if the deed conveys a fee simple
title, though subject to the possibility of reverter, the grantee, its successors and assigns would have the right to exploit thereon for oil and gas.
4. The languageused to create the estate: In Tiffany, Real Property,
3rd edition, volume I, section 220, at page 385, it is said: "No set formula is necessary for the creation of the limitation, any words expressive
of the grantor's intent that the estate shall terminate on the occurrence
of the event being sufficient:" and in note 86 reference is made to "Restatement, Property, section 44, comment 1. The matter, however, cannot be dismissed so shortly. It is true that the courts will endeavor to
carry out the intent of the grantor, but that intent must be ascertained
from the language used as interpreted by the court. Furthermore, in
drafting the instrument a distinction must be made between the right of
possibility of reverter arising out of a conditional limitation and those
other types of right of possibility of reverter arising out of a condition
subsequent, so called easements, etc. See the Attorney General vs. Merrimack Mfg. Co. (1860), 14 Gray (80 Mass.) 586." This case is so
important on this point that it is given almost in full.
In Attorney General v. Merrimack ManufacturingCo. (1860), 14
Gray 586, 80 Mass. 586, we have an action by the Attorney General
"for the establishment and execution of a charity in a church lot in
Lowell and the church and parsonage thereon standing, and to recover
the price paid by the relators" (rector, wardens and vestrymen of St.
Anne's Church) "for the church."
On the 3rd of May, 1826, the Merrimack Manufacturing Company, a community developing company, sold to the Proprietors of the
Locks and Canals on the Merrimack River, a corporation, certain property including the church lot, and, on the same day, the Proprietors etc.,
by a separate deed, "in consideration of one dollar" "and for the purpose
of supporting divine worship," re-conveyed the church lot, the church
and the parsonage to the Merrimack Company, "their successors and
assigns forever, sq long as they shall use or permit the same to be used
and appropriated to divine worship and for a residence of the minister of
the gospel, and no longer"; * * * "but upon failure thereof the said
Proprietors, and their successors and assigns, may reenter upon the prem-
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ises, remove and expel the tenants and occupiers thereof, take and keep
seisin and possession thereof to their own use and benefit in fee simple,
and be and become seised and possessed thereof, as of their former
estate."
On May 22, 1830, the Proprietors made a deed of release to the
Merrimack Company, reciting the last named deed of May 3, 1826, for
a consideration of ten dollars, forever releasing to the company, their
successors and assigns, the provisions and conditions expressed and contained in the deed aforesaid so that the company, their successors and
assigns shall have, possess and enjoy the premises free of all conditions,
to their own use and behoof forever.
The argument for the relators was that-by the deed of May 3, 1826,
the Proprietors conveyed a base or qualified fee to the respondents, and
that the fee became vested in the respondents, with a mere possibility of
reverter to the grantors if the use should cease and the limitation take
effect. The words used are express words of limitation-"so long as,"
"quamdiu," "dummodo"-and cannot be held to create a condition,
especially in a conveyance in fee.
The court held that the words did not create a trust or a limitation
but did create an estate upon condition, which estate was made absolute
by the subsequent release from the grantors. The court distinguished
between an estate upon condition and an estate limited in the following
words (see pp. 611-61 2 ) :
"It is perhaps hardly material to determine whether the
clauses in the deed which refer to the appropriation of the land to
certain uses, and fix the rights of the parties in case such appropriation should cease, are to be construed as creating a limitation, or a
condition, if it should appear that no trust was established; because
the deed of release of the Proprietors of the Locks and Canals of
May 22d 1830, by which all 'the provisions and conditions' in
the former deed were released to the respondents, would seem to be
clearly sufficient to perfect their title, and to extinguish the interest
of the Proprietors of the Locks and Canals, whether that interest
were regarded as a right to reenter for breach of a condition, or a
possibility of reverter upon the happening of the event which constituted the limitation. And the court are all of the opinion, for
reasons substantially like those which have been given in considering the question of dedication, and from a careful examination of
the terms of the deed, that no trust was intended by the parties, or
constituted by the conveyance. The Proprietors of the Locks
and Canals, in their relations to the new community, which became
the city of Lowell, and in their objects and motives for providing
for the support of public worship, were substantially the successors
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of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company. The words 'in trust'
are not found in the deed, although they are the usual and well
known phrase when the creation of a trust is designed; and we
think there is nothing in the circumstances or relations of the parties to show that they contemplated a beneficial interest in the
estate to be enjoyed by any individual or corporate body, or by the
public at large, beyond their own administration and control. And
although there are apt words in the deed to create a limitation, and
sufficient for that purpose if they stood alone, we think that all its
parts taken together do create an estate upon condition, and that
by such a construction every portion of the deed is made effective,
and its obvious purposes are most completely executed.
"The distinction between an estate upon condition, and the
limitation by which an estate is determined upon the happening
of some event is, that in the latter case the estate reverts to the
grantor, or passes to the person to whom it is granted by limitation
over, upon the mere happening of the event upon which it is limited, without any entry or other act; while in the former the reservation can only be made to the grantor or his heirs, and an entry
upon breach of the condition is requisite to revest the estate. The
provision for reentry is therefore the distinctive characteristic of
an estate upon condition; and when it is found that by any form
of expression the grantor has reserved the right, upon the happening of any event, to reenter, and thereby revest in himself his former
estate, it may be construed as such. Shep. Touch. 121, 122. Lit.
§§ 329, 330. 4 Cruise Dig. title 32, c. 25. 4 Kent Com. (6th
ed.) 125, 126. The words 'provided,' 'so that,' and 'upon condition that,' are the usual words to make a condition; but to say that
if a certain event happen the grantor may reenter, is equally effectual. And the reason of this rule of construction is, that the stipulation for a right of reentry would be senseless if the deed were
construed to create a limitation; because the estate vesting upon the
mere happening of the event, the right to enter would of course
follow with all other rights of ownership."
These provisions in the deed are construed as limitations and not as
conditions subsequent. The rule is clearly and expressly stated in Burlington & C. R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co. (1906), supra, as
follows:
"As will be observed, it was expressly provided in the Gerspach
deed to Sigler 1&Co. that upon the happening of a certain contingency,
to wit, the final abandonment of the right of way for the purposes
therein set forth, then the rights granted should cease and revert to the
respective parties of the first part. This clause in the deed should be
construed as a limitation, and not as a condition subsequent, and, there-
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fore, upon the happening of the event provided, the control and use of
the land would pass to the owner of the fee without entry or claim.
Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90; Mitchell v. Bourbon County, 76 S. W.
16. It appears from the evidence that before the ouster complained of
the ditch had been entirely abandoned. It follows that the title to the
strip of land then held by the appellee was at that time freed and cleared
of any and all rights theretofore granted to the Sigler Company."
The simplest set of facts suggesting possibility of reverter are those
found in an Ohio case. A grantor, for a valuable consideration, conveyed by deed the title to a lot to the trustees of a church. The habendum clause barred the title from returning to the grantor or his heirs
"so long as said lot is held and used for church purposes." That was
all there was in the transaction. The habendum clause did not add to
the quoted words the phrase "and no longer," nor did the deed contain
a provision for reverter, or grant a right of re-entry. The court held no
possibility of reverter was created.
The Ohio case referred to is the "Matter of Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church (April, 1929), 120 Ohio State 309, 166 N. E.
218, wherein the owner of a lot, by a deed conveyed the same, for a
valuable consideration, to the trustees of the church. The habendum
clause read as follows:
"To have and to hold the premises aforesaid unto the said
grantees and their successors so that neither the said grantor or his
heirs nor any other person claiming title through or under him
shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the
premises or any part thereof; but they and every one of them shall
by these presents be excluded and forever barred so long as said lot
is held and used for church purposes."
The deed contained no provision for forfeiture or reversion, nor
provision for re-eantry upon condition broken.
After the deed was executed the trustees erected upon the lot a
church building.
In due course of time the trustees abandoned the use of the premises for church purposes and petitioned the court for an order authorizing
it to sell the building. The heirs of the grantor of the lot claimed the
church building as an appurtenance to the land, on the theory that upon
a disuse of the premises for the purposes for which it was granted, the
title to the lot and its appurtenance, the church building, reverted to the
grantor's heirs.
The court decided that even though no longer used for church purposes, the lot and the church building belonged to the trustees and not to
(Continued in May Issue)
the heirs of the grantor.
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The Bar's National Plan
for Local Defense
By FRAZER ARNOLD*
The Committee on National Defense of the American Bar Association was appointed by President Lashly last September. It consists of
a general chairman, Mr. Edmund Ruffin Beckwith, of New York City,
and one member from each of the ten (10) Federal judicial circuits.
The able and indefatigable chairman also acts as committeeman from
the 2nd Circuit. Mr. Beckwith maintains committee headquarters in
the Mill Building at Washington, and spends most of his time there,
with an organized staff.
The plan is nation-wide and means to carry the forming of committees down' to "grass roots" by having a national defense committee
in every county or other appropriate community-leaving the exact local
form elastic to meet peculiar home conditions.
In Colorado, for example, our state president, Mr. Hutton, named
Mr. John L. Zanoni state defense chairman and appointed seventeen
district chairmen, one for each of our seventeen (17) local bar associations; and those district chairmen are appointing county chairmen for
each of their counties.
The president of the Kansas Bar Association arbitrarily divided
his state into sixteen (16) districts of about five (5) counties each, and
those district chairmen appointed defense chairmen for each county.
And so on, as the state president finds appropriate in his own region.
The names and addresses of these chairmen from each state, district
and county go to Mr. Beckwith in the Hill Building.
As you see, the purpose is to create an all-inclusive and sensitive
network of lawyers from coast to coast.
Why?
What is the purpose and mission of this committee organization?
We have heard of the Red Network. We know also that the Nazi
regime has its network in this country-active, or awaiting further developments-usually both.
While there are American agencies officially charged with the mission of neutralizing those hostile networks, it is believed the network
principle can be turned to valuable account by the lawyers of this republic, for different purposes, and to meet many possibilities, some of which
can and many of which cannot now be foreseen.
Mobilization is in its comparatively slow stage, yet already the
*Of Denver.

Regional Chairman of the A. B. A. Committee on National Defense.
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national effort is on a larger scale than is obvious to those in civil life.
Singly and by groups, young men are disappearing to join the teeming
activities at army and navy schools, camps, cantonments and bases. This
will increase at accelerated speed. By late summer, maneuver areas from
Alaska to Georgia, in mountains, woods and swamps, will swarm with
some of the forces that are probably destined to shatter the dreams of
enslavement spun in Germany and Japan.
The spectacle of this free republican giant, armed and equipped,
may seem as sudden as the apparition of a re-armed Germany which
burst upon the sleeping French and British about 1936.
When this has been accomplished, the dull movements of every-day
law, substantive and adjective, will seem dry and irrelevant to us.
Whatever the effects upon our national life of this mobilization
will be, American lawyers hope that our traditional liberties will be
respected and upheld. We hope that final victory will be over the spirit
of slavery and despotism as fully as over the flesh and steel of its
armed forces.
Up to the present, our defense committee chairman has worked
with the departments of War, Navy and Justice in preparing the "Manual of Laws," a very thick pamphlet, for use by all advisory boards for
registrants throughout the country. This manual will also be the reference Bible of company commanders and other officers in military and
naval service for everything touching legal questions. It has been prepared in close collaboration with the army and navy to this end. Letters from the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Bureau of Navigation
of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the Army and others attest the
importance of this contribution by the legal profession. As mobilization
grows and the war becomes more immediate, other contributions by the
organized bar will increase and appear in every county, town and hamlet in some form.
Another activity, arising especially around the camps in New Jersey, and probably elsewhere by now, has been legal aid. This is to
help individual soldiers and sailors when unable to have other proper
advice, or where their company or ship commander cannot give them adequate protection. Few things are worse than a dramatic case of injustice
done to some soldier who has not committed any real offense, especially
if the injustice is done, or seemingly done, by civil authorities.
If a controversy between civil and military officials is allowed to
develop, a rankling sense of injustice may lead to reprisals by enlisted
men and a general bad feeling, which prompt action by lawyers and
responsible civil officials could avoid.
In the present fateful and uncertain state of affairs, it can only be
said that the work of these county and local defense committees of the
bar may be of value at any time.
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A series of memoranda is being sent to each local defense chairman
as notice of his appointment reaches the national headquarters. These
detail the possible ways in which the local bar may help in mobilization.
But, in my opinion, the main reliance must be upon the watchfulness
and judgment of the local committee, as no two conditions are wholly
alike.
While it is supposed that our main function will be to further a
successful -preparation of men and industries, events may later dictate
local effort, backed by a nation-wide organization, for the vindication
and survival of private rights against executive or legislative usurpation
in ulterior, over-zealous or unauthorized activities not at all justified by
military necessity.
For example, if a military commission were to assume the authority to try and sentence a civilian, somewhere in the zone of the interior,
outside of any theatre of war or insurrection, the lawyers should rally
to vindicate his constitutional rights.
The principles involved ought to be much better understood now
than they were during the Civil War. However, this is doubtful when
we consider the current disposition of the Federal Supreme Court and
others to withdraw from the citizen the constitutional protection heretofore clearly recognized, and of letting the executive or legislative
branches wreak their will in many different directions hitherto carefully
channeled.
Failure of the bar to give any organized opposition to this tendency has been a nation-wide disappointment. It has left the despoiled
citizen, in his particular case, as helpless as though the country possessed
no great body of sound legal opinion that believed him to be in the right.
On the other hand, depending upon how the menacing storms of
war or insurrection may veer, there may be instances when the military
and executive authority will need to be strongly upheld by lawyers in
their proper and constitutional jurisdiction. For example, there may
be domestic upheavals, either engineered from abroad or arising from
the greed and turbulence of elements in the civil population. That will
mean a condition of martial law to be invoked by governors of states,
or in a proper case (which, incidentally, is clearly defined in the Constitution) by the federal executive himself. In violent times. any Governor
and any President, with their military authorities, must be upheld by a
unified bar in the exercise of their constitutional function and discretion.
On the same principle, we should oppose any executive, high or
low, who tries to violate our inheritance of liberty under a specious plea
of war-time or "emergency."
A couple of years ago, Mr. Hogan, when he retired as our national
president, summarized the alarming results of recent Supreme Court decisions and, in substance, he warned the lawyers of his country that appar-
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ently the legislative department must now be the keeper of constitutional
freedom, because the original design of. the federal courts as the main
check and protection has broken down at the top.
How can there be any hope for the restoration and survival of our
system of coordinate independent branches, of our plan of adequate
checks and balances, of a government of laws and not of men, unless
lawyers are willing to make a serious and united effort, carried down
into every county, to bring this about?
I have read the statements of our bar executives and of spokesmen
of this defense committee, and there emerges the clear impression that
this committee may form the beginning of a wide attempt, not only for
a successful national effort in preparedness and war, but also toward
buttressing our ancestral liberties against the disastrous erosion of recent
years.

Colorado Bar Achieves Great Reforms in
New Rules of Procedure
April 6, 1941, will long be one of the outstanding days in the history of jurisprudence and bar association work in the history of Colorado. On this date the new rules of civil procedure went into effect.
Representing the greatest single achievement of law reform in the
history of the state, the new rules are the result of two and one-half
years of constant teamwork among the lawyers, judges, bar associations
and courts and stand as a tribute to the untiring efforts of the Revision
Committee under the capable guidance of the indefatigable Philip S.
Van Cise of Denver.
On September 10, 1938, the Colorado Bar Association at its annual
convention unanimously resolved that the Colorado Code of Civil Procedure be amended to conform to the Federal Rules as soon as practicable,
and that to accomplish this result a committee be appointed to draft the
new rules. As a result of this resolution, the then president of the
state bar, G. Dexter Blount, appointed Philip S. Van Cise to head the
Rules Committee and empowered him to select a committee of 75 lawyers from throughout the state.
This committee was divided into sections, each section of which
had charge of writing a particular section of the new rules. By continuous and strenuous work during 1938 and 1939, the committee was able
to report to the state convention in September, 1939, that it had secured
an act of the legislature granting to the Supreme Court the right to make
rules of civil procedure and that a rough draft had been partially prepared. The convention endorsed the work of the committee and ordered
it to proceed.
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Thereafter the various sections of the Rules Committee prepared a

rough draft of the rules, which it submitted to the whole committee.
This first draft was then revised by the Revision Committee with a view
of harmonizing the sections and the adoption of uniform terminology.
A second draft was then sent to every lawyer and judge in the state, and
supplemental amendments were later mimeographed so that at the convention of the state bar held in 1940, the rules were nearly in final form.
After a discussion at the convention, the state bar unanimously
adopted a resolution approving the new rules and urging the Supreme
Court to place them in effect. The third draft of the rules came into the
hands of the Supreme Court in the late fall. After studying the rules
and granting the right to anyone to file objections to them, the Supreme
Court, altering the draft in only a few details, adopted the third draft on
January 6, 1941, making them effective as of April 6, 1941.
The work of the Van Cise committee, which has attracted national
attention, was not finished with the adoption of the new rules; In conjunction with the Institutes Committee under the chairmanship of Edward L. Wood, assisted by the president-elect, W. W. Platt, four regional meetings were held in the state at which over seventy per cent of
the practicing lawyers were in attendance. Members of the Revision
Committee served as lecturers at these institutes, which were held at
Denver, Greeley, Pueblo and Grand Junction. A special institute for
judges of the trial courts and their clerks was held in Denver, with all
of the judges of the District Courts attending except one judge, who,
because of a conflict in engagements could not be present, but who later
attended one of the regional meetings.
While great praise should be extended to all members of the bar
and the courts who cooperated to produce the new rules, especial praise
should go to Mr. Van Cise, who gave many hours of both his time and
that of .his office without reimbursement and who was the driving force
behind the entire task. Without any doubt the present rules are the
outstanding work of all the states engaged in this task. They have
received the favorable comment of many of the leading jurists and lawyers over the entire country, and have paved the way to similar achievements in other states.

Colorado Bar Now 100"c Organized
Second only in importance to the new rules is the achievement of
the state bar in now having every section of the state organized into local
With the organization of the Continental Divide Bar
associations.
Association, comprising the counties of Eagle, Summit, Lake, Park and
Chaffee on March 27, 1941, every section of the state now has a local
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bar association, membership in which carries membership in the Colorado
Bar Association.
The Continental Divide Bar Association selected as its officers:
Wm. J. Meehan of Eagle, President, Carl Kaiser of Breckenridge, VicePresident, and J. Corder Smith of Leadville, Secretary-Treasurer. Its
delegate on the Board of Governors will be named as soon as its charter
has been granted at the meeting of the board in April.
In addition to the petition of the bar of the fifth and eleventh districts for membership, the County Judges Association and the District
Attorneys Association have voted to become affiliated as units of the
state bar. With these two associations acting as an integral part of the
Colorado Bar Association, every professional group of lawyers and jurists in the state will be banded into one comprehensive organization.
Moreover the judges of the courts of record have signified a desire
to call a conference of all judges on the day prior to the annual convention of the state bar. If this conference is held as now planned, it will
be in line with the recommendation of the Colorado Bar Association,
made in 1940, which suggested that conferences of the trial and Supreme
Court judges be held yearly. Such conferences had been successfully
held in other jurisdictions and have resulted in uniform methods of procedure within the state, and have produced beneficial changes in procedure and court detail.

Law Day to Be April 26
The annual Law Day of the University of Colorado Law School
will be held at the Law School building in Boulder on Saturday, April
26. The topic of discussion for this year will be "Office Practice;"
Professor James Brenner of Stanford University, who successfully conducted institutes on this subject on the west coast, will talk about certain
phases of office practice and other phases will be discussed by a panel of
practicing lawyers. The Law Day program will begin at ten o'clock.
A luncheon will be served at noon, and a dinner is scheduled for that
evening under the auspices of the Boulder County Bar Association. A
meeting of the Board of Governors of the state bar will be held in the
Law School building commencing at 2:00 o'clock.
A more complete announcement of this event will be made by the
Law School. Arrangements for Law Day are under the direction of
Professor Milton Green.

Colorado University to Hold Conference on Trusts
Some of the nation's outstanding bar association members and legal
teachers will be among the speakers at the conference on trusts and bank-
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ing law to be held at the University of Colorado July 19 and 20. The
event will be one of ten special conferences at C. U.'s summer sessions.
Mayo A. Shattuck of the Boston bar, authority on trusts; Fleming
James, Jr., Yale Law School, insurance law specialist; William E. Britton of the Illinois University Law School, authority on bills and notes;
and Austin W. Scott of the Harvard law faculty will be among the
speakers at the trusts and banking conference.
Another event of interest to financial authorities will be the Colorado Bankers Institute, at which state bank executives and other employes
will discuss matters of mutual concern. The institute will be held from
July 17 to 19. These conferences will follow the pattern of those held
last year. Further information can be obtained from Dean Edward C.
King, Law School, Boulder.

Roy T. Johnson
Roy T. Johnson, 53, Logan County judge and former district attorney in northern Colorado, died Sunday, March 30, 1941. He will
be succeeded in the office of county judge by Joseph A. Davis, who has
been clerk of the District Court in Logan County for the past 22 years.
Judge Johnson, born June 21, 1887, at Scandia, Kansas, was graduated from the Lincoln, Nebraska, high school and the University of
Nebraska law school. He was appointed to the judgeship when H.
Lawrence Hinkley resigned to join the attorney general's staff three
months ago. He established a law practice at Julesburg, Colorado, in
1909 and moved to Sterling in 1920. He was elected District Attorney
that same year, an office which he held sixteen years.
He is survived by his wife and a son, Roy T. Johnson, Jr., and one
brother, Senator Ed C. Johnson.

Criminal Rules Committee Appointed
Judge J. Foster Symes, Judge of the United States District Court
for Colorado, on April 2nd appointed Kenneth W. Robinson of Denver
as chairman of the Colorado Committee to aid in drafting new rules of
procedure in criminal cases for the Federal courts. Named to assist Mr.
Robinson are United States District Attorney Thomas J. Morrissey,
District Attorney James T. Burke of Denver, Harry S. Silverstein of
Denver, B. F. Koperlik of Pueblo, Robert G. Smith of Greeley, and C. J.
Moynihan of Montrose.
This committee will aid a committee of the United States Supreme
Court in drafting the new rules for criminal procedure in a manner
similar to a corresponding committee appointed several years ago when
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the United States Supreme Court was drafting rules of civil procedure.
The new work is undertaken under authority of a statute enacted in the
last session of Congress granting to the Federal Supreme Court the rulemaking power in criminal cases.

Clyde W. Turnbull
Clyde W. Turnbull, 65, of 828 So. Columbine St., Denver attorney, prominent in Masonic circles and a resident of the city sixty years,
died March 11, 1941, at his home after three weeks of illness.
Mr. Turnbull was born in Michigan, January 9, 1876. He came
to Denver with his parents in 1881, when he was 5. He attended
schools here and when he was 15 started work as an office boy in the
Denver law office of the late United States Senator Charles J. Hughes.
He studied law at the Denver University Law School, was graduated in
December, 1899, and admitted to the bar January 7, 1900.
After the death of Senator Hughes in 19 11, Mr. Turnbull continued in the employ of Gerald Hughes, the senator's son, in the law offices
of Hughes & Dorsey. He was a Past Master of Highlands Masonic
Lodge No. 86, the Denver Athletic Club, the Lakewood Country Club,
and was an ardent golfer.
He is survived by his wife, Mrs. Nora Belle Turnbull; a daughter,
Mrs. David T. Gibson; a son, Clyde W. Turnbull, Jr., all of Denver;
a brother, Clinton Turnbull, member of the fire department, and three
grandchildren.

New Regulations under Civil Relief Act
The Secretary of the Navy was empowered under Section 300 of
the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 to prescribe regulations
concerning the allotment of the pay of a person in service to discharge
the rent of the premises occupied for a dwelling by his dependents. On
January 6, 1941, regulations were issued which provided, among other
things, that allotments shall be made only when ordered by the Secretary of the Navy in each instance and only (a) where a court has ordered
that a person in service discharge the rent of the premises and the commanding officer of the ship and station recommends to the Secretary that
an allotment for this purpose be registered, or (b) where a commanding
officer submits to the Secretary facts supporting a recommendation that
an allotment be directed in absence of a court decree.
Donald J. Gilliam, Denver attorney, was appointed librarian of
the Colorado Supreme Court library, effective April 1. He succeeds
A. L. Betke of Denver librarian for the last year, who resigned March 1
and was granted a vacation of one month.

Supreme Court Decisions
No. 14648. People u. Graham. Decided February 3, 1941.
The people's appeal from a decision of the Denver District Court
quashing an information alleging violation of Sections 174 and 176,
Chapter 16, 35 C. S. A., requiring motorist involved in an accident to
stop, return, furnish information and give assistance to injured. The
motion to quash was sustained below on the ground that the accident
occurred in Denver, a home rule city under Section 6, Article XX of the
Constitution, and as such had exclusive jurisdiction by existing ordinance
over this as a local and municipal affair. Reversed. The offenses
charged in the information are not exclusively a local matter. They
are of general public concern and come under the general police power
of the state. En Banc. Opinion by Justice Bock.

No. 14669. Elliott v. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver.
Decided February 3, 194 1.
Suit against the grantee of a warranty deed upon an assumption of
mortgage indebtedness appearing in such deed. The court finds that the
undisputed evidence discloses no consideration running either way between grantor and grantee of such warranty deed. Hence the theQry of
assumption of the mortgage indebtedness resting as it does in Colorado
upon third-party beneficiary doctrines, cannot be sustained; such thirdparty beneficiary contract requires consideration. Opinion by Justice
Bock. Justices Young, Bakke and Knous dissent.

No. 14868. IndustrialCommission v. Colorado State Federation
of Labor, et al. Decided Febcuary 3, 1941.
The commission made a finding that the construction of a highway
underpass at 46th and Vine in Denver constituted "highway construction" and that rates of wages theretofore established by the commission
in another finding were applicable. The District Court, concluding that
the true issue before the commission was not the character of the construction but the prevailing wage scale, remanded the matter for further
commission hearing. The commission appealed to this court.
HELD: The District Court is affirmed, but in view of the fact
that during the pendency of tlse proceedings the job has been completed
and the issue has become moot, the decree of the court is ordered changed
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Opinion by Justice Knous.

No. 14881. Industrial Commission, et al. v. The Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., et al. Decided February 10, 194 1.
A workman taking a bath on the premises of the employer following the close of his day's work was not at the time of the accident performing services within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Opinion by Justice Bock.
No. 14905. Craig v. Totive. Decided February 10, 1941.
Upon conflicting evidence judgment upon verdict of jury for plainOpinion by Justice
tiff in assault and battery action not disturbed.
Knous.
No. 14758. Sukle v. People. Decided February 24, 1941.
It is improper to answer a query of a jury in a murder trial that if
sentenced to life imprisonment, the defendant would be eligible to parole.
Opinion by Justice Hilliard. Justice Bock dissents.
Townsend v. People. Decided February 24, 1941.
Instruction upon the issue of first degree murder by means of torChief
En Banc.
ture reviewed and held erroneous and prejudicial.
dissent.
Burke
and
Bakke
Justices
and
Jusrice Bouck
No. 14876. French v. Ins. Co. Decided February 24, 1491.
HELD: That a provision on the back of fire insurance policies in
fine print conditioning the validity of the coverage upon the fact of ownership of the realty in fee simple, may be and was waived, by facts showing no misrepresentation by assured, no concealment, good faith and
careful payment of premiums, together with absence of inquiry by the
insurer plus acceptance and retention of the premium, with presumptive
knowledge of the condition of the title. En Banc. Opinion by Justice
Young.
No. 14612. Peters v. Schillig-Scott Lumber Company. Decided
March 3, 1941.
The question of the adequacy of the averment of facts in a complaint to state a cause of action for negligence must be viewed in light of
the proposition that where reasonable minds differ on the existence of
negligence of a property owner in maintaining his premises, the issue is
for a jury, and held reversing the trial court that the complaint is sufficient against a general demurrer. Opinion by Justice Bock.
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